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PA N EL D ISC U SSIO N  ON M O T O R  V E H IC L E  
A C C ID E N T  L IT IG A T IO N  
University of New Brunswick Faculty of Law, 
March 28, 1955.
Chairman: Professor W illiam F. Ryan.
Panel: J. Paul Barry, Q .C., E . Neil McKelvey, Donald 
M. Gillis, Henry E . Ryan.
Chairman: "This panel discussion is being sponsored by the Saint 
John Law Society, the Legal Education Section of the Canadian Bar 
Association and Continuing Legal Education Committee of the New 
Brunswick Barristers’ Society.
W e have as members of the panel J. Paul Barry, O .C., Mr. Neil 
McKelvey, Mr. Donald Gillis and Mr. Henry Ryan. All have had ex­
perience in motor vehicle accident litigation, and I am sure we will profit 
from their experience.
Question 1
How do you go about collecting and organizing evidence in an 
automobile accident case?
Answered by Mr. Barry
There are different ideas on this. From an insurance standpoint, 
wc get reports from insurance adjusters, which are more often than not 
inaccurate. I might illustrate what I mean. You get a report from a 
witness, gathered py an adjuster, who isn’t trained, generally speaking, in 
taking a statement for use in court. You also find, I think, when acting 
for a plaintiff that the plaintiff wants to tell you everything in his fav­
our. He wants to meet all of the arguments that he expects and convince 
you, no matter what you hear from other sources, that what he has said 
overcomes those arguments. The insurance adjuster gathers evidence 
from the standpoint that the company he represents is not liable. Now, 
neither the plaintiff, if you are acting for him, nor the insurance adjuster, 
if you are acting for the insurance company, has to present the case in 
court. That is the greatest problem that 1 find in beginning to get a 
picture of the case. The facts are presented to vou by your client from 
nis own standpoint without any appreciation of the otner person’s and 
the insurance adjuster is interested in getting a statement, which he 
presents also to tne company, to support his recommendation that you 
deny liability.
You must see your witnesses. You must examine your witnesses in 
the same manner that you would examine witnesses for the opposite side. 
I think that you have to cross-examine the witnesses in your own office, 
at the same time explaining to them why you are doing it because they 
may resent it. Until you convince your own client, be he plaintiff or 
defendant, of the problem that he is up against, he will have no appre­
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ciation of anything cxcept liis own viewpoint, and anybody who has 
been in an accident, almost without exception, maintains lie is not to 
blame.
You must of course see the police report, if there is a police report, 
and there is today in nearly every accidcnt ease. The policc report is 
usually objective.
You should visit the scene of the accident. It is no use, of course, 
for vou to take the measurements and to sec how far the visibility extends 
or where the buildings are. Your witnesses and your client must do that.
You have to have a plan of the scene of the accident because judges 
will ask for it: a plan of the area with the measurements, the width of 
the street, the height of the curb, the width of the sidewalk, the posi­
tion of the buildings on the different corners concerned— most accidents 
occur at intersections—and the width of the shoulder. Arc we to deal 
with injuries or damages in a motor vehicle accident ease?
Chairman: I think you could mention that matter.
Mr. Barry: If it is with respect to a vehicle, our experience gen­
erally is that solicitors agree on the amount. If it is not agreed on, and 
in mv experience in ninety-five percent of eases it is, you must call the 
mechanic or the service foreman of the garage who either estimated the 
repairs or did the repairs to establish exactly what the repairs consisted 
of and the cost and that this is a reasonable estimate and a reasonable 
repair bill. There is some difficulty encountered because some judges 
don’t want to accept the opinion of car salesmen 011 depreciation, on 
what it was worth before and after the accident.
M r. McKelvey: I have one thought that arises out of what Mr. 
Barn said about insurance adjusters. A solicitor who is acting for an 
insurance company has a great advantage over one who is not in that 
he does have adjusters who can produce the witnesses for him. You at 
least know who your witnesses are. On the other hand, if vou are ap­
proached cold by a client, he wants you to do everything. l ie  hasn’t 
got anybody to gather the evidence. To my mind, the lawyer has not 
only to interview the witnesses but find out who the witnesses are. 
That means in a great many cases vou have to visit the scene of the 
accident and find some housewife who happened to be looking out the 
window at the time it happened. If you don’t do that you will find 
that the insurance adjuster nas done it on the other side and will pro­
duce the witnesses that you wanted, or should have seen, if they are 
against you, so that you could avoid the litigation altogether.
Question 2
Smith, the owner, lends his car to Jones. Jones collides with Black’s 
car which was borrowed and is being driven by W hite. Both cars are 
damaged and W hite is injured. If Smith sues W hite alone what should 
Black do? If Smith sues Black alone, what should W hite do? If Smith 
sues both Black and W hite what should each of them do?
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Answered by Mr. Gillis
There arc four people involved: two owners, and two drivers. W hen 
you consider this question with two owners and two drivers, there are 
three thoughts you should keep in mind; first, the Motor Vehicle Act 
that makes an owner liable for his driver’s negligence. That is something 
new in the past year or so. Secondly, the Contributory Negligence Act, 
and, thirdly, what is now known as the Tortfeasors Act. I am assuming 
in this question there is contributory negligence.
Smith is one owner. He lends his car to Jones. Jones collides with 
Black’s car. If Smith sues W hite alone what should Black do? W ell, if 
I were Black’s solicitor, I would apply to be added to the action as a co­
defendant and counter claim. You could apply under Order 16, Rule 
11. Then W hite well might be a joint tortfeasor with Jones, who is the 
driver of Smith’s car; if so he probably should claim contribution or 
indemnity against Jones; I think it would be a proper case for W hite 
to bring Jones, the other driver, in as a third party; so we would add Black 
as co-defendant and take third party proceedings against loncs. In that 
way W hite would claim contribution or indemnity. That is what I 
would do.
Now, if Smith sues Black, that is one owner against the other, what 
should we do? W hite suffered damage. He has got a claim against Jones 
and against Smith. So the situation would be just reversed. I would 
suggest joining W hite as a co-defendant under Order 16, Rule 11. He 
and Black could counterclaim against Smith.
Now, if Smith sues both Black and W hite what are each of them 
to do? Each of them obviously could counterclaim against Smith be­
cause Smith is liable under the Motor Vehicle Act, ana they could add 
our friend Jones, the driver, by counterclaim. But in that case I would 
still consider third party proceedings because they might want to claim 
contribution or indemnity from Jones. As I say, that would be my solu­
tion. It may not be the only one, but I can see nothing wrong with it.
Chairman: If Smith sues both Black and W hite do you think that 
Black, who is the owner of the car, could take third party proceedings 
against W hite?
Mr. Gillis: W ell, he could. If it is a question of insurance he 
wouldn’t, I wouldn’t think. It would depend a good deal on the financial 
worth of our friends Smith and Jones. Black could take third party pro­
ceedings against W hite.
Chairman: Suppose Smith got a judgment against Black, and 
Black was required to pay the judgment?
M r. Gillis: Yes, I think probably you should take third party pro­
ceedings and in that case obviously you wouldn’t need an order, you 
would just issue your third party notice, under Order 16A, Rule 12. 
One co-defendant against another co-defendant.
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Chairman: Do you think that Black and W hite arc joint tortfeasors?
Mr. Gillis: I wouldn’t say Black and W hite. W e were talking about 
Jones and W hite.
Chairman: Might not Black take third party proceedings against 
W hite? You said, Yes”.
Mr. Gillis: Yes. It would be possible.
Mr. Barry: That is before he is joined as a co-defendant?
Mr. Gillis: No. He is a co-defendant.
Chairman: Would it be on the basis that they are joint tortfeasors? 
I am wondering if Black would have a claim against W hite on the 
ground that Black and W hite are joint tortfeasors?
Mr. Gillis: W hy do you say Black and W hite are joint tortfeasors? 
T he Motor Vehicle Act doesn’t make them joint tortfeasors.
Mr. McKelvey: I think it is covered by the Tortfeasors Act. A tort­
feasor liable in respect of that damage may recover against another tort­
feasor, whether as a joint tortfeasor or otherwise.
Mr. Gillis: I would say Black is not a tortfeasor.
Chairman: W ould you say Black is a tortfeasor only if there is a 
vicarious relationship?
Mr. Gillis: Yes.
Mr. Barry: There is some confirmation of what Prof. Ryan suggests: 
v, nere the statute makes a person liable for his driver without a vicarious 
relationship by implication he is in the same position as a joint 
tortfeasor. W e know that the owner of a car today is responsible for the 
act of the driver to whom he has no vicarious relationship. That being 
so and bearing in mind what Mr. McKelvey read from the Tortfeasors 
Act, if he is liable he is almost in the same position as a tortfeasor; in 
ilmost the same position as a master. The situation does exist in some 
other provinces and there is authority for what Prof. Ryan has suggested.
Mr. McKelvey: In other words he is sort of a statutory tortfeasor.
Mr. Barry: He is made statutorily liable.
I think, Mr. Chairman, that there are a lot of problems in question
two.
Chairman: W ould you suggest another approach?
Mr. Barry: If you could present to me one aspect, I would rather 
answer that.
Chairman: Let me put the first question: if Smith sues W hite alone 
what should Black do? As I understand Mr. Gillis he says that Black 
should apply to be added as a co-defendant. W ould you agree with 
that approach?
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Mr. Barry: If I were acting for Black I would issue a writ for Black 
against Jones and Smith.
Mr. Gillis: Then you have two actions.
Mr. Barry: But W hite is the only defendant of the other action.
Mr. Gillis: You have got two actions.
Mr. Barry: I appreciate that.
Mr. Gillis: You are disregarding the other action.
Mr. Barry: W hat should Black do? Sue Smith and Jones.
Mr. Gillis: W hat if you were acting both for W hite and Black?
Mr. Barry: I don’t think I could act for both of them.
Chairman: Isn’t there a possible conflict of interest?
Mr. Gillis: Not if Black is insured.
Mr. Barry: I don’t think I could act for them even if they were both 
insured.
Mr. Gillis: How could there be a conflict?
Chairman: Black’s car is driven by W hite; there is a relationship of 
bailment and there could be a conflict.
Mr. McKelvey: There could be a subrogation claim against the 
driver.
Mr. Barry: Let us take an actual ease. All three of the panel are 
aware of this. T he owner of a car loaned it to a friend of his and it was 
in a collision with another car driven by another person to whom that 
car was loaned. T h e owner, who was home in his bed, finds out in the 
morning that his car has been wrecked and he sues the driver and owner 
of the other vehicle, The driver of the other vehicle issues a third party 
notice against the driver of the car owned by the man who was home 
in bed. That vehicle is insured, so the driver is in effect being sued in­
directly in a chain of relationship by the owner of the car he was driving. 
If a judgment goes against him, since he is an insured under the owner s 
policy, the owner of the car who started the action is going to recover 
part of the damage from the insurance company who insures him; so I 
give it as an illustration of how a conflict of interest could arise between 
Black and W hite.
The Chairman: There is an interesting House of Lords case on 
that type of situation, Digby v. General Accident, [1942] 2 All E .R . 319.
Question 3
Do you think that photographs taken after an accident are useful 
in establishing causation? How are such photographs put in evidence?
Answered by M r. McKelvey
This one has the advantage of being a bit simpler than the last. I 
think what you mean here is in establishing liability. The answer 
to the question has to be yes, photographs are useful. But it has 
to be qualified because in many cases photographs are misleading. 
There are four factors that have to be bome in mind when dealing witn
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photographs. The first one is that when the photographs arc taken 
they have to be taken with a view to their being used in evidence. Per­
haps I can illustrate. A commercial photographer arriving on the scene 
of an accident will probablv take a picturc of the vehicles. If there is a 
body lying in the middle of the road he will take a picture of the body. 
But the lawyer is interested in such things as skidmarks or where are 
the cars in relation to the curb, things like that. You look at the thing 
from an entirelv different angle. There was one case I remember, an 
intersection collision, and a photographer was on the scene within min­
utes. I Ie didn’t show am pictures at all of where the vehicles were. One 
was a fire engine and the other was a bus. lie  didn’t bother looking at 
them, but he did go up the street and took pictures of the skidmarks 
made bv one of tne vehicles approaching the intersection. lie  knew 
what was necessary in evidence and these pictures were very useful.
T he sccond factor is— show the vehicles, if possible, or landmarks if 
the vehicles arc still at the scene, and if the question is where did the 
accident occur, you can sometimes get it from the position of the 
vehicles. If vou have any landmarks and you have a picturc showing 
that the left front wheel of the car is on the shoulder of the road or up 
on the curb or something like that, then it is very easy to reconstruct 
what happened. Another example of the same thing are skidmarks, if 
they are still 011 the road, or if the vehicle collided with anything you can 
show how it collided, for example, if he went through a guard rail.
The third factor is that they are useful to show the nature of the 
highway or the place where the accident happened. I remember a case 
where we were told that the accident occurred 011 an upgrade. There 
was some dispute as to whether there was any visibility. W e argued that 
it was a straight hill with a knoll at the top and that the accicient hap­
pened half-wav up the hill. Pictures taken several months later showed 
that that hill was straight.
The fourth factor I think is important is to realize that pictures 
can be misleading. A local solicitor told me once that one of the factors 
involved in an action was whether the road was rough or smooth. W ell, 
a photograph was taken from an angle ciuite close to the ground so 
that all the pebbles looked like rocks; looking at that picture the road 
looked very rough. You can do funny things with pictures. You can 
make pebbles look like rocks and bv means of different types of lenses 
vou can distort what you see. A picture, to be of any use at all, must 
be a straight lens so that a witness should be able to say that that is 
an exact photographic reproduction of what is there. If the opposing 
lawyer is the one who is putting pictures in evidence you should be 
verv careful to make the photographer explain just how he took those 
pictures.
I think we might mention something about motion pictures. Our 
courts now will accept motion pictures. My view there is, motion pic­
tures are no good in evidence unless the motion is important. There 
is no point in taking a motion picture of a road with 110 motion going
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on. If motion or the way cars turn a certain corner is a factor, moving 
pictures can show it, but if on the other hand you are just taking a 
picture on a road or street there is no point in having a motion picture.
How do you put them in evidence? W ell, that should be done by 
the photographer who can swear that that is what he saw when he took 
it and that it is a photographic reproduction of what he did see and he 
can also explain how he took it and what kind of lenses he used. If 
you haven’t got the photographer than you can always do it by someone 
who was present wnen it was taken. He can’t say that he took the 
picture or that is the picture he took but he can say that is what he saw 
when he was standing there. I think I have seen it done that way 
and our courts will acccpt it, but it is much better to have the photog­
rapher there.
Mr. Gillis: Must you have the photographer or someone who was 
there when the picture was taken in order to put it in evidence?
Mr. Barry: Anyone who can swear that the picture is a true represen­
tation of the scene.
Mr. McKelvey: I think you will agree that it is better to have the 
photographer there.
Mr. Barry: If he swears that it represents the scene, you take it for 
granted that it isn’t distorted.
Mr. McKelvey: You run the risk of cross-examination on how 
accurate it is.
Mr. Gillis: If you get it into evidence who cares? There is another 
thing that occurred to me that I find useful in these photographs. I 
’ Ice to have a picture of the automobile that was involved in the
The Chairman: Have there been any expressions of judicial opinion 
on the weight to be given photographic evidence?
Mr. McKelvey: There is a recent Nova Scotia case in which Mr. 
Justice MacDonald went into it. He was talking about plans mainly 
but I think he mentioned photographs, too; he said they were very 
useful.
Mr. Gillis: W hy shouldn’t it be weighed the same as any other 
evidence?
M r. Ryan: Because it can be very misleading.
Mr. Gillis: Any witness might lie, too, on the witness stand.
Mr. Ryan: You have him there and he is subject to cross-examin­
ation.
Mr. McKelvey: I think it is true they must be dealt with like any 
other evidence.
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M r. Gillis: I feel photographs can be conclusive in some respects. If 
it is a question of which side of the road a motorist was driving, if you 
have a picture of the skid marks on the left hand side, that is it.
Mr. McKelvey: You can, as I said, distort pictures. In many ways
f>ictures can show what you want them to show and you have to be care- ul particularly if you are opposing, to cut down their usefulness.
Mr. Barry: But you have to answer the question, “Are photographs 
after the accident useful?” Yes, they arc.
Question 4
(a) To be contributorily negligent must the plaintiff be guilty of 
breach of a duty of care owed by him to the defendant?
(b) “W hen a man steps into the road he owes a duty to himself 
to take care for his own safety, but he does not owe to a motor­
ist who is ^oing at an excessive speed any duty to avoid being 
run down.’ Denning, L.J., in Davies v. Swan Motor Co. Ltd., 
[1949] 1 All E .R . 620 at 631. Do you agree?
The Chairman: I think the ordinary rule is that negligence con­
sists of a breach of duty of care which one person owes to another per­
son. If there is to be contributory negligence, must the plaintiff be 
guilty of a breach of duty of care to the defendant?
Answered by Mr. Ryan
Contributory negligence is raised in I would sav at least ninety per 
cent of the automobile cases. There is a case that I would refer to and 
I think it probably answers the question without leaving very much 
doubt. It is Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co., Ltd., 
[1951] 2 All E .R . 448. That was in the Privy Council, by the way. The 
headnote states, and I think it is quite concise that:
When contributory negligence is set up as a defence, its existence does 
not depend on any duty owed by the injured party to the party sued 
and all that is necessary to establish such a defence is to prove to 
the satisfaction of the jury that the injured party did not in his own 
interest take reasonable care of himself and contributed, by this want of 
care, to his own injury. For when contributory negligence is set up 
as a shield against the obligation to satisfy the whole of the plaintiff's 
claim , the principle involved is that, where a man is part author of 
his own injury, he cannot call on the other party to compensate him 
in full. This, however, is not to say that in all cases the plaintiff who 
is guilty of contributory negligence owes to the defendant no duty to 
act carefully. Indeed, it would appear that in cases relating to running- 
down accidents such a duty exists. T he proposition can be put even 
more broadly. Generally speaking, when two parties are so moving 
in relation to one another as to involve risk of collision, each owes to 
the other a duty to move with due care, and this is true whether they 
are both in control of vehicles, or both proceeding on foot, or whether 
one is on foot and other controlling a moving vehicle.
Chairman: That headnote answers the second part of the question 
as well as the first.
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Mr. Ryan: I was just going to cover the quotation in part (b) of the 
question by reading in part the judgment of Viscount Simon. In the 
Nance case, Viscount Simon says after quoting Lord Justice Denning’s 
proposition, “when a man steps from the kerb into the roadway, ne 
owes a duty to traffic which is approaching him with risk of collision to 
exercise due care, and if a sentence of the judgment of Denning, L.J., in 
the Davies case . . .  is to be interpreted in a contrary sense, their Lord­
ships cannot agree with it.” I think that answers the question.
The Chairman: You would say, then, in answer to the first part of 
the question that a plaintiff can be contributorily negligent by being 
careless for his own safety.
Mr. Barry: But isn’t that a duty he also owes to the motor vehicle 
driver? The dutv might be in one sense to take care for his own safety, 
but it is also a duty he owes to the public using the highway. It becomes 
a duty to the motor vehicle driver and he is expected to observe it.
Question 5
W hen a motorist is charged with having “care and control” while 
intoxicated what is the effect on a claim by him under a motor vehicle 
liability policy of (a) a conviction or (b) a plea of guilty?
Answered by Mr. Barry:
I think in either case he has got two and a half strikes on him. If 
he drives the car and it can be established that he was unable to drive 
it properly because of intoxication he has breached the statutory con­
dition. It may be argued that this is splitting hairs, that he pleaded guilty 
because he didn’t want to bother with the publicity and it was chcaper 
to do that than hire a lawyer and so on, but once he breaks the statutory 
condition he can expect no protection from the policy. The third partv 
is entitled to recover under the policy up to standard limits only if the 
insured cannot pay and has no assets with which to pay the third party.
Mr. Gillis: I am fully in accord.
Mr. McKelvey: I agree with what you say, he has two and a half 
strikes against him because his insurer won’t do anything to help defend 
the case if there has been a conviction or plea of guilty, but supposing 
it is a question of a court deciding whether there nas been a breach or 
the conditions; now is a civil court entitled to take into consideration 
what a criminal court has done?
Mr. Gillis: You don’t expect to get a sympathetic hearing in a civil 
case if you say, “My client wasn’t intoxicated”, and the judge says to you, 
“If he wasn’t guilty, why did he plead guilty?”
Mr. McKelvey: I still say as a matter of law it has to be proven 
all over again in a civil court.
Mr. Barry: But as a matter of practice you have had it.
The Chairman: Is the conviction admissable in evidence in the civil 
case?
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Mr. Gillis: On cross-examination I think it is. You can ask him and 
if he won’t admit it you can prove it.
Mr. Barry: In the Canada Evidence Act it is almost the same. 
Confront him with the proposition; if y o u  get a denial get a certificate.
Mr. McKelvey: But a plea of guiltv wouldn’t carry the same weight.
The Chairman: A plea of guilty may be an admission.
Mr. McKelvey: Is it an admission if you plead guilty to save the 
expense of time and publicity caused by a protracted ease?
Mr. Gillis: An innocent man wouldn’t plead guilty.
Mr. Barrv: The court has got to assume that y o u  know the full 
significance of the plea.
The Chairman: W hat is the effect of putting the question to the 
plaintiff, “W ere you conv icted of the crime of having care and control, 
etc.,” and he says, “Yes”; now what docs that go to? Does it just go to 
his credibility or is it admission as tending to prove one of the issues in 
the case?
Mr. Barry: If it is a plaintiff suing an insurance company, it is going 
to prove one of the issues in the case, a breach of the statutory condi­
tion on the ground that at the time of the accident for which he is 
claiming indemnity he was intoxicated so that lie was unable to control 
the vehicle.
Mr. McKelvey: Suppose the conviction has been one of driving 
while impaired. The degree of intoxication that you have to prove in 
the Insurance Act is somewhat greater than on a cnarge of impairment. 
A conviction on an impairment charge would only apply to impairment 
of faculties, but not necessarily to the impairment of faculties to the 
extent that you have to prove under the Insurance Act.
Mr. Barry: You get into the criminal aspect of it. There is some­
times no relationship between the intoxication and the accident but if 
vou are operating a car while unable properly to control it and the accid­
ent results in a civil action prima facie that is one of the causes.
Mr. McKelvey: Couldn’t you be found guilty of care and control 
while intoxicated on a set of facts which would not involve a violation 
of that particular statutory condition of the insurance policy?
Mr. Barry: And an accident had occurred? It might be theoretical- 
Iv possible. It may be theoretically possible that the person who was 
convicted of care and control did not contribute to the accident at all, 
but I don’t think that it would justify them in claiming indemnity from 
the insurance company because once they drive the car unable properly 
to control it they breach the contract.
The Chairman: Can’t you be guilty under the Criminal Code with­
out being impaired to such an extent that you are incapable of proper 
control?
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Mr. Barry: Theoretically, yes.
The Chairman: Once you admit the possibility the issues are not 
the same.
Mr. Barry: You can conceive of situations where thev are not neces­
sarily the same. I can conceive of a person being guilty of either and not 
being responsible for the accident but I think, though, that if they are 
guiltv of having care and control that in practical consequence they 
cannot succeed.
I’he Chairman: W hy should a conviction bv a judge or jury in a 
criminal case have weight in a civil case? The judge in the civil case 
must come to his own conclusion; why should he pay any attention or 
why should he be permitted to pay any attention to the verdict in the 
criminal court?
Comment from Audience: W hen you get a case decided you 
have got to accept it.
The Chairman: Not unless you have the same parties and issues or 
the judgment is in rem. T he parties and issues arc not the same in the 
criminal and civil cases.
Mr. Barry: I think the question is academic, la k e  an actual case. 
The plaintiff is confronted with the Question, was he convicted of care 
and control as charged at the particular time and arrested at the scene 
of that accident, and he says yes.
The Chairman: That involves a statement that a criminal court 
came to the conclusion that he was guilty on the criminal charge.
Mr. Barry: You would have to ask, “IIow much did you have to 
drink?” You have to prove it again. You have answers, combined with 
his admission that he was convicted by a criminal court.
Question from Audience: Does he have to testify?
Mr. McKelvey: No.
Mr. Gillis: How is he going to succeed if he doesn’t? How is he 
going to prove ownership or this vehicle?
Mr. McKelvey: I think the law is on Prof. Ryan’s side.
Question 6.
Do you think that “reaction time tables” are useful? How should 
they be used? Do you ever consider calling expert witnesses on “reaction 
time”?
Answered by M r. Gillis:
I am glad you said, “Do you think?” Personally, I don’t, but I will 
say this: they are used. I have argued that they should not be but I 
am told that they are useful as a guide.
U. N. B. LAW JOURNAL 27
How should they be used? I don’t know that that is too much 
of a problem. In one ease a witness was asked, if going ten miles per 
hour in what distance could he stop his car. He said, “In six inches.”
Do y o u  ever consider calling expert witnesses on reaction time? I 
do and I think it would be very' useful; unfortunately, around here we 
don’t have such expert witnesses to call. They should be automotive 
engineers. If you look at the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Adam v. Campbell, [1950] 3 D .L.R. 449, Mr. Justice Cartwright goes 
into the question. That accident happened in Ontario and in tnat ease 
thev did call expert witnesses. The expert witnesses testified that at a 
certain speed the distance it would take that driver to stop was so much. 
That is cxactlv what we use in these reaction tables and they proved it 
there bv an automotive engineer. But when the question was put to the 
expert witness, “W hat would be the reaction time for the emergency?’’ 
he said, “I don’t know. I didn’t test it but I think it would take longer.” 
In that case Mr. Justice Cartwright said that was inadmissible because 
his evidence was not based on any test. It is my opinion on this case 
that the reaction time should be proved by an expert witness. I would 
like some day to call an expert witness on it.
Mr. Barry: I don’t think myself that the tables are useful except 
sometimes to sav that a witness is not telling the truth. It just shows that 
what lie says cannot rcasonablv happen.
Mr. McKelvey: Does it actually impcach his truthfulness? He says, 
“ It takes me three feet to stop going ten miles per hour,” but he is not 
an automotive engineer. You produce a reaction table saying it takes 
twentv feet, but what does that prove?
Mr. Gillis: It shows he is exaggerating or a poor judge of distance. 
Question 7.
As a matter of trial strategv, do you think it good tactics to plead 
contributory negligence if you arc satisfied that the other party was 
solely to blame?
Answered by Mr. McKelvey:
W hat I think the question is directed at is this: if you are acting 
for one driver and vou think the other man is definitely to blame 100/4, 
should y o u  admit the possibility that your man might have been partly to 
blame. I think that is what it means. It seems to me that vou should 
in the case of pleadings. Supposing vou are acting for the plaintiff and 
you think the defendant is 100% to Dlame. I don’t think in your pleading 
vou need to admit that vour client might have been partly to blame. 
You state that the defendant was 1009< to blame. You could rectify it 
in vour replv. If you are acting for a defendant in your defence you 
have to admit your partial responsibility because you don’t get the op­
portunity to rectify that in your reply. \ (  you are just defending the claim 
vou have to say in your counterclaim that the defendant was not to 
blame, the plaintiff was to blame 100%, or that the plaintiff was partly 
to blame. The answer to the question is that you have to do it in your
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pleadings: if you are the plaintiff you can do it in your replv, if you arc 
a defendant you don’t get the second chance, you have to do it in the 
one chance that you have, the defence.
As a matter of trial strategv during the course of the trial there is 
a lot of room for doubt here whether you should argue that the other 
man is 100% to blame or whether you should admit that your own 
man might be partly to blame. My view is that you should mention the 
fact that if you are wrong in saving that the other partv is 100% to blame 
that he was certainly parlv to blame to the tune of >0%, 6 0 9 i, 95% or 
whatever. If vou argue before a judge the proposition that the other 
man was 100% to blame you give the judge the chance to say he agrees 
with you or he doesn’t agree with vou. If ne doesn’t agree with you tnere 
is the possibility that he may say he wasn’t to blame at all. You should 
argue strenuouslv your own viewpoint that the other man was 100% 
to blame but add as an afterthought that if he wasn’t 100% he was 
at least partly to blame. I don’t feel you weaken your main argument 
and vou give the judge the opportunitv if he doesn’t agree with vou 
100% perhaps he will pick 75% or 85% or something down the line 
until he finds something in your favour. Make sure you mention it in 
order to give the judge a chance to work his way down the line.
Mr. Barry: I don’t agree at all. I wouldn’t plead it if I thought the 
other party was solely to blame. I don’t think it is good tactics to plead 
it, nor, if you have a good case, even to mention it. I suppose Mr. Gillis 
can give you the figures more accurately than I, but 85% of the cases are 
decided on contributory negligence. How does a court say 60, 40, 80, 20? 
They do, but I don’t Know now they do it. Mr. Gillis has had more 
experience with contributor)' negligence than I. You may plead it if you 
like.
Mr. McKelvey: You certainly have to allege that the other partv was 
negligent. You don’t have to mention contributory .
Mr. Gillis: In this case I agree with Mr. Barry. If you have a good 
case I wouldn’t give anything away. I would avoid contributory neglig­
ence. In a weak case you wen might plead contributory negligence.
Question 8.
Must “res ipsa loquitur” be specially pleaded? W ould you agree 
that the doctrine is no more than “a rule of evidence, of which the es­
sence is that an event which in the ordinary course of things is more 
likely than not to have been caused by negligence is by itself evidence of 
negligence”? Give some examples of situations in automobile accident 
cases that would give rise to a plea of res ipsa loquitur.
Answered by Mr. Ryan:
In my opinion it does not have to be specifically pleaded.
Mr. Barry: You don’t have to plead it, but if you do not argue it 
you may be precluded from arguing it on appeal.
Mr. McKelvey: I have seen it pleaded in a good many cases.
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Mr. B am : It doesn’t have to be. The word is “must.”
M r. Ryan: There is authority that it need not be pleaded in Hanson 
v. Weinmaster, [1951] O .W .N . $68.
I agree with the quotation. I might just refer to an authority, 
Barkway v. South Wales Transport, [1950| 1 All E .R . 392.
As an example, take a child walking along the street and a car comes 
up on the sidewalk and strikes him.
It would be a case of res ipsa loq u itur. I would say if you were 
properly parked with your car on King St. in the day time and somebody 
comcs along and runs into you, that would be an example. There arc 
numerous cases where it would apply.
Mr. McKelvey: Is it possible to have res ipsa loquitur where you 
have two moving vehicles?
Mr. Ryan: I would say there is a possibility.
Mr. McKelvey: I can’t see how there could be if there arc two 
moving vehicles.
Mr. Gillis: W hat if one vehicle was on his own side of the road 
driving along, minding his own business, and another car comes around 
the curve on the wrong side going ninety-five miles an hour and the 
driver is intoxicated?
Mr. McKelvey: I don’t see how it could possibly apply where you 
have two moving vehicles.
Mr. Gillis: W hy don't you say it would not be so apt to apply?
Mr. Barry: I can see under the rule in the London and St. Katherine 
Docks case that if there are two controls the rule cannot apply.
Mr. Gillis: That is true. I don’t think it happens too frequently. 
Question 9.
Does the plea of “inevitable accident” involve more or less than a 
straight denial of negligence? If more, why use it?
Answered by Mr. Barry:
It involves more and the only reason I can think of to use it is 
to bring it to the attention of the Court.
Mr. Gillis: W hy take that on yourself?
Mr. Barry: Only from a psychological standpoint if you have evid­
ence to justify it.
Mr. Gillis: It is not necessary to plead it.
Mr. Barry: If you have the kind of a case to establish it I think it is 
more satisfactory' to be able to prove a positive thing if you can than 
just to disprove an allegation. I nave never used it because I have never 
oeen in a position to establish an inevitable accident.
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Question 10.
Do you think Bird v. Armstrong, 27 M .P.R. 54, in effect abol­
ishes the “last dear chance” doctrine in New Brunswick?
Answered by Mr. Gillis:
If you would ask me to state the answer with either “Yes” or “No”, 
1 would say, “Yes, it does”. 1 am not convinced that that was a proper 
decision. W hat happened in that case was this:— the trial judge found 
both the defendant and the plaintiff guilty of negligence, the defendants 
negligent in that they left some unlighted piles of gravel on the road at 
night and the plaintitf in driving too tast. The trial )udge said, “I believe 
that if lie had been travelling at a reasonable rate of speed he could 
have avoided the accident.” It strikes me that was the last clear chance 
but the Court of Appeal didn’t see it that way. They said it was a case 
of contributor)' negligence. There still is, I think, in our law room for 
that doctrine and you will see in a recent case, the Malenfant case, de­
cided a few weeks ago that Mr. Justice Kellock puts that proposition 
right back. He says, “If one person is negligent but the other person 
could have avoided it”— so there you are. As 1 say, our Court of Appeal 
seem to say there is no such thing as last clear chance any more, but I 
still feel that there will be a case that will go to the Appeal Court and 
the doctrine will conic back. I think there is still a place in our law for 
it, but don’t use the words “last clear chance”.
The Chairman: If there is a doctrine of last clear chance would it 
apply only in a situation where the plaintiff was aware of the situation 
of danger created by the defendant or should it be extended to a case 
where the plaintiff ought reasonably to have been aware?
Mr. Gillis: Ought reasonably to have been aware according to the 
Sigurdson case.
Question 11.
Is violation of a section of the Motor Vehicle Act ever conclusive 
or pnn.a facie evidence of negligence?
Answered by Mr. McKelvey:
The courts seem to hold that it is prima facie evidence of negligence. 
It must of course be a section of the Motor Vehicle Act pertaining to 
the rules of the road or the manner in which traffic is regulated on the 
highway—keeping to the right and driving around the middle point of 
an intersection for example. Two cases LeBlanc v. S .M .T. [1949] 23 
M .P.R. 145, in our courts and Kirby v. Kalyniak, [1948] S.C .R. 544, 
in the Supreme Court of Canada hold that it is prima facie evidence of 
negligence. There may be some cases that say it is not evidence at all 
but I think the better view is it is prima facie evidence of negligence be­
cause when you are driving a vehicle on the highway you yourself are 
bound to obey the rules of the road and the other people are too; they 
owe a duty to you and you to them to abide by these rules. It is pos­
sible to conceive of cases in which it would be practically conclusive; for
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example, driving around a blind curve on the left hand side of the road is 
a violation of the Motor Vehicle Act. If a collision results on the other 
end of the curve I think that is conclusive evidence of negligence. On 
the other hand merely on a stragiht stretch to travel on the left hand side 
of a road which happens to have a double white line on it, if the stretch 
is straight, is not necessarily conclusive. It may be prima facie but that’s 
all.
Question 12.
Do you think that to violate statutory condition 2 (2) of a motor 
vehicle policy the owner who permits an intoxicated person or one who 
is unauthorized or unqualified to drive must know of the condition of 
that person when the permission is given.
Mr. Barry. Yes.
Mr. Gillis. Not necessarily; not when it is given. If he has reason 
to believe that that person might well become intoxicated it might have 
effcct.
Mr. McKelvey: Knew or should have known, don’t you think?
The Chairman: I think there is a recent decision in Saskatchewan 
in which it was held that knowledge is necessary.
Question 13.
A, the owner and driver of a car, collides with and causes $2,000 
in damages to B ’s car. The insurer, liable for only $1,000, believes that 
A is wholly to blame and would like to settle for $2,000 to avoid costs. A, 
however, refuses to settle and insists that the insurer should defend. 
W hat should the insurer do?
Answered by Mr. Gillis:
W hat is the obligation of the insurer? My feeling is this. An insurer 
is lcgallv bound under the contract of insurance to defend. There is no 
wav out. Thev are going to incur costs and thev can do whatever is pos­
sible to keep the costs down; they can make admissions. They are justi­
fied in doing that. If A is being obstreperous and insists on a defence, 
thev must defend but can make such admissions as they deem advis­
able to keep the costs down.
The Chairman: W ithout necessarily disagreeing, may I raise a ques­
tion on what Mr. Gillis has said. As 1 understand it, his answer was 
predicated on the assumption that under the insurance contract the in­
surance company is bound to defend. True there is the covenant in the 
contract that the insurance company undertakes to defend, but there is 
another covenant to the effect that the insurance company may settle 
on such terms as it deems expedient. If it thinks that certain terms 
are expedient, is it under an obligation to go on and perform its other
Fromise to defend? Could it say, ‘I have the contractual right to settle, advise settlement on these terms.” If the insured refuses to put up 
the extra $1,000 then, of course, there can’t be a settlement, but could 
it be argued that the insurance company performed its obligation under 
the contract by tendering performance or its promise to settle on such 
terms as it thinks expedient, provided, of course, that ultimately a court 
will find that an insurance company actcd reasonably and in good faith?
Mr. Barry: There is some authority to that effect but apparently the 
court seemed to feel in a recent case that the obligation to defend is 
just as important as to settle on terms that it thinks fit and if the insured 
wants to be defended, his company has that obligation.
Mr. McKelvey: The agreement to settle can’t permit the insurance 
company to settle for any figure it sees fit. If vou have an insurance com­
pany whose coverage is only $1,000 and you nave a claim that ought to 
be settled for $10,000, that covenant does not give the insurance com­
pany the right to settle for $10,000 of which the company pays only 
$1,000. They can’t settle for $1,000 because the other party won’t 
accept it.
Mr. Barry: They can cither settle or defend. They can’t do partly 
one and partly the other.
Mr. McKelvey: Could it be that the settlement clause applies only 
where the policy limit cxceeds the claim?
The Chairman: The terms of the contract are “settle on such terms 
as it deems expedient.”
Mr. McKelvey: But you have to restrict that. The insured doesn’t 
agree that he will contribute the difference between the coverage and 
the settlement. There is nothing like that in the policy.
The Chairman: Yes, I see the force of that. If the proposed settle­
ment exceeds the policy limit the insurer is not in a position to tender 
performance.
Question from Audience: Couldn’t they defend the action and settle 
as soon as they get started?
Mr. Gillis: You could make a bona fide admission of liability to 
keep the costs down.
Mr. Barry: I would hesitate to do it if the insured said, “No.” 
Question 14.
A car owned and being driven by Mr. Smith and in which Mrs. 
Smith is a passenger collides with a car driven by Jones. Mrs. Smith was 
personally injured. Smith was grossly negligent and was two-thirds to 
blame; Jones who was also negligent was one-third at fault. Mrs. Smith 
sues Jones, and proves damages of $1,500. How much will she recover 
from Jones?
Answered by Mr. McKelvey:
I assume that she brings action against Jones and the judge in that 
action sets the liability of 2/3 Smith and 1/3 Jones. She can only 
recover 1/3 from Jones and the reason is that the Contributory Neglig­
ence Act, s. 3, says so.
The Chairman: I want to thank the panel for their very fine job. 
I think we have all profited from the discussion.
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